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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
: Criminal No. 9707 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Supreme Court No. 860063 
vs. : 
: Argument Priority 
DOUGLAS CARTER, : Classification No. 1 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether defense counsel's representation was so ineffective as 
to violate the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June. 14, 1985 the Defendant appeared with counsel 
before the Eighth Circuit Court for Utah County, Provo 
Department. On that occasion the Defendant represented that he 
had retained counsel, an attorney from Chicago, Illinois (R. 5). 
Retained counsel represented the Defendant at preliminary hearing 
on July 25, 1985 and again appeared with the Defendant at 
arraignment and trial setting (R. 30). Defense counsel 
represented to the court that it would file a motion to suppress 
a statement given by the Defendant and that it would file a 
motion for a change of venue. The matter was set for trial on 
October 3, 1985. On September 27, 1985, the public defender's 
office at the request of Defendant's retained counsel moved that 
the trial date be continued to insure that Defendant's retained 
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counsel had enough time to file the proposed motions on the 
Defendant's behalf. A new trial date was set for December 12, 
1985. 
On November 29, 1985, defense counsel filed motions to 
suppress and change venue. He also gave notice of the defense's 
intention to present an insanity defense or in the alternative 
the defense of diminished capacity (R. 35-54). The Defendant was 
not at the hearing when these notices and motions were presented 
to the court (R. 55). Defendant maintains that he did not consult 
with counsel when the alienists were appointed and should have 
consulted with counsel prior to speaking with these individuals. 
On December 2, 1985, an order appointing two alienists was signed 
by the Court (R. 56). On December 11, 1985, the defense counsel 
withdrew the notice of insanity defense or in the alternative the 
defense of diminished capacity (R. 64, 415-422). The prosecutor 
objected to the defense counsel's withdrawal of notice and argued 
that a hearing should be held to determine that the Defendant was 
competent to proceed to trial (R. 417). Defense counsel in 
response stated that ". . . the defense does not choose to 
advocate or go ahead with that as a defense and, certainly, upon 
perusing the evaluation." The Defendant acknowledged to the 
court' s- questions that he was in agreement with his counsel's 
actions (R. 419). His counsel made no effort to obtain an 
evaluation by an independent examiner. 
The Defendant used heroin or LSD daily for about five years 
during the 70fs (R. 1412). The Defendant has an I.Q. of 75 which 
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falls within the borderline range of an intellectual ability. The 
full scale I.Q. score places him in the 5th percentile (R. 1424). 
Both mental evaluation reports were introduced during the penalty 
phase of the trial by the defense counsel for the purpose of 
presenting Defendant's background to the jury (R. 1411-29). 
Other than prepare the motions for the Defendant, the 
Defendant's counsel did not engage in other extensive 
investigation. He made no motion for discovery nor did he make an 
effort to examine evidence held by the county attorney (R. 1300-
4). He did not attempt to get expert testimony supporting 
Defendant's motion for change of venue. Defense counsel never 
made an attempt to obtain the tape recording made of the 
Defendant at the time he gave his statement to determine if it 
corresponded with the statement that the Defendant made to 
Detective Pierpont. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant's counsel was ineffective in that he failed to advise 
Defendant of the consequences arising from his interview with the 
two alienists appointed by the court; in that he failed assert 
and maintain Defendant's defense of diminished capacity and that 
defense counsel later introduced the mental evaluations which 
contained repeated denials of the offense which greatly 
prejudiced the jury against the Defendant. 
These errors cumulatively prejudiced the Defendant's case. 
If counsel had persisted in these defenses, it is possible that 
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the Defendant would not have received the death penalty but life 
imprisonment. 
POINT I 
WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION WAS SO 
INEFFECTIVE AS TO VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
I t i s t h e fundamenta l r i g h t of eve ry Defendant t o have t h e 
e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . U .S . C o n s t . A r t i c l e IV; Utah 
C o n s t . A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 12. Wi thout c o u n s e l , t h e r i g h t t o a 
f a i r t r i a l i t s e l f would be of l i t t l e c o n s e q u e n c e . T h i s i s 
e s p e c i a l l y t r u e in a c a p i t a l c a s e . The accused i s e n t i t l e d t o be 
a s s i s t e d by an a t t o r n e y who has t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o i n s u r e t h a t 
t h e t r i a l i s f a i r . Avery v . Alabama, 308 U .S . 444, 60 S . C t . 3 2 1 , 
84 L .Ed . 377 ( 1 9 4 0 ) . 
The United States Supreme Court has opined that in order to 
establish ineffective representation, the Defendant must prove 
both incompetence and prejudice. With respect to incompetence, a 
strong presumption exists that defense counsel's performance is 
within the range of professional assistance unless the Defendant 
proves otherwise. The Defendant bears the burden of proving that 
counsel's representation was inadequate under the prevailing 
standards of the legal profession and that the challenged action 
was not sound strategy. The reasonableness of counsel's 
performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the 
time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. 
The standard of review is highly deferential to the attorney who 
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has reasonably exercised his judgment on behalf of the Defendant. 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed2d 305 
(1986). 
Further the Defendant must show that he is prejudiced by his 
attorney's ineffectiveness by demonstrating that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's professional 
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting his guilt. 
Utah's constitutional standard under Article I, Section 12 
appears to be similar to the federal standard. State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401 (Utah, 1986). 
Effective assistance does not attach only to matters 
affecting determination of actual guilt at trial. To deprive a 
Defendant of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more 
damaging than the denial of counsel during trial. A defense 
lawyer has the obligation to investigate the case and a failure 
to conduct adequate pretrial investigation can support an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For example, counsel 
can be guilty of ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
investigate the seriousness of mental problems from which the 
Defendant may be suffering. Mental evaluation of a Defendant is a 
critical stage at which the Defendant has a right to counsel. A 
defense attorney should not be allowed to automatically hide his 
failure to investigate, advise and prepare a viable defense by 
simply raising the shield of trial tactic or strategy. 
The Defendant now asserts that his counsel erred in 
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withdrawing his defense of diminished capacity or insanity. The 
psychological evaluations indicate that the Defendant has a I.Q. 
of 75 with borderline intellectual capabilities. He relied on 
counsel's judgment that these evaluations were authoritative and 
conclusive. His counsel had months to seek an outside evaluation 
on the issue of mental competency. Yet his defense counsel at 
the last moment, fourteen days before trial requested that mental 
status evaluation be conducted. Normally thirty days is given for 
these evaluations. Here, the doctors evaluated the Defendant in a 
few days and returned reports. Neither doctor had a time to 
observe the Defendant for any length of time and defense counsel 
had no time to seek an independent second opinion. Rather defense 
counsel advised his client that he should withdraw his notice of 
these two defenses. 
Defense counsel's actions clearly prejudiced the Defendant. 
Had the Defendant presented his defense it would have been 
possible for the jury to conclude that he did not have the intent 
to commit the offense for which he was charged. 
Defense counsel's failure to investigate -and request 
discovery was clearly below the levels of professional 
competence. Counsel failed to request discovery and evaluate the 
evidence in the hands of the State. He admitted he was surprised 
the State's evidence and was unprepared for it. He failed to 
thoroughly investigate his client's mental status and withdrew 
his client's notices when he was not prepared to go forward with 
his presentation. He failed to properly investigate his client's 
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background and introduced the mental status evaluations which 
greatly influenced the jury because of the Defendants repeated 
denials of the crime. These denials were the product of an ill-
advised client who was unaware of how he should respond to the 
questioning of these medical personnel. Each of these failures 
prejudiced the client to a small degree but cumulatively 
prejudiced the client before the jury so that they returned a 
sentence of death rather than life imprisonment. It is possible 
had counsel fully prepared his case, the jury would have a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the death sentence would have been 
imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not receive effective assistance of 
counsel and the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ?£- day of July, 1987. 
GARY'H. WEIGHT "^ 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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